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ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement is the last hope to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. The
consensus agrees to holding the increase in global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C. Each Party’s successive
nationally determined contribution (NDC) will represent a progression beyond the
party’s then current NDC, and reflect its highest possible ambition. Using Ireland as a
test case, we show that increased mitigation ambition is required to meet the Paris
Agreement goals in contrast to current EU policy goals of an 80–95% reduction by
2050. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets, the technically feasible scenarios’
abatement costs rise to greater than €8,100/tCO2 by 2050. The greatest economic
impact is in the short term. Annual GDP growth rates in the period to 2020 reduce
from 4% to 2.2% in the 1.5°C scenario. While aiming for net zero emissions beyond
2050, investment decisions in the next 5–10 years are critical to prevent carbon lock-in.
Key policy insights
. Economic growth can be maintained in Ireland while rapidly decarbonizing the
energy system.
. The social cost of carbon needs to be included as standard in valuation of
infrastructure investment planning, both by government finance departments and
private investors.
. Technological feasibility is not the limiting factor in achieving rapid deep
decarbonization.
. Immediate increased decarbonization ambition over the next 3–5 years is critical to
achieve the Paris Agreement goals, acknowledging the current 80–95% reduction
target is not consistent with temperature goals of ‘well below’ 2°C and pursuing 1.5̊C.
. Applying carbon budgets to the energy system results in non-linear CO2 emissions
reductions over time, which contrast with current EU policy targets, and the
implied optimal climate policy and mitigation investment strategy.
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Decarbonization targets need to be ambitious to stabilize temperature and equitable to enable global collective
action, while acknowledging common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities to mitigate
and adapt (Schellnhuber, Rahmstorf, & Winkelmann, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015). The nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) which built the consensus underpinning the 2015 Paris Agreement have reduced the probability
of global temperature increase below the previous projections of 3.7°C to 4.8°C during the 21st century
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(Edenhofer et al., 2014), but only marginally so. On their current trajectory, the NDCs will not put global GHG
emissions on a trajectory consistent with the Paris Agreement goals of limiting temperature increase well
below 2°C towards 1.5°C (International Energy Agency, 2015; UNFCCC, 2016).
Cumulative emissions of anthropogenic CO2 is the primary driver of post-industrial anthropogenic temperature
increase (Allen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013; Matthews, 2009; Millar et al., 2017; Rogelj, Reisinger, et al., 2015). van Vuuren
et al. (2016) point to the simple strength of this near linear relationship in that, (1) long-term temperature does not
depend on CO2 emissions at a specific time, (2) near-term emissions are important as they also exhaust the carbon
budget and (3) CO2 emissions will need to be phased out to net zero eventually to achieve temperature stabiliz-
ation (see also Rogelj, Schaeffer, et al., 2015). The remaining cumulative CO2 emissions that would result in a 1.5°C
or 2°C temperature increase with a given probability can be ascribed to a total carbon budget (Friedlingstein et al.,
2014; Rogelj et al., 2016), and needs to be fairly allocated given acceptable effort sharing rules (Bows & Anderson,
2008; Kober, Van Der Zwaan, & RöSler, 2014; Raupach et al., 2014; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017).
The EU has committed to policies to mitigate the risks of climate change and to minimize the eventual adap-
tation costs required of EU citizens. The long-term policy perspective is that EU GHG emissions reduction should
be between 80% and 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. This goal was established by an EU Parliament resolution
in 2009, taking the lead from the fourth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(Meinshausen et al., 2007), but which was predicated upon a 2°C limit, not a 1.5°C target, where global CO2 emis-
sions would plateau between 2000 and 2015 at levels 16% lower than the current rate.
This article explores deep decarbonization scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement and above current
national EU mitigation targets using equitable carbon budgets.
We take Ireland as a case study, and explore the impacts of equitable carbon budgets constraints on a hybrid
general equilibrium technology-rich integrated energy systems modelling method. Ireland is a particularly inter-
esting case study for several reasons. It is unique in the EU with a large share (>30%) of GHG emissions from
agriculture. The reduced scale of mitigation options in agriculture – both in terms of the production efficiencies
currently available and potential future options in research and development (Chiodi et al., 2016; Kuramochi
et al., 2018) – places a disproportionately high burden on the energy system to decarbonize relative to other
member states. Ireland’s transition from an agriculture to service-based economy in a relatively short industri-
alization period will be of interest to similar open service-based economies, and emerging economies aspiring to
replicate this transition. Ireland is unusual in that it is one of seven member states likely to breach the EU 2020
GHG annual reduction targets, from 2016 onwards, and is one of only two member states (alongside Malta) that
did not bank enough emissions allowances following the economic recession of 2008–2009 to balance the
cumulative GHG reduction component of the 2020 targets (European Environment Agency, 2017). Ireland’s elec-
tricity network is the smallest national synchronous power system in the EU. It has the highest share of variable
renewable electricity supply on a synchronous power system and is leading globally in wind energy integration.
Lastly, Ireland is a useful case study in that it is large enough to be relevant, yet small enough to enable detailed
analysis.
1.1. From uncertain reduction targets to equitable carbon budgets
The remaining global carbon budgets for a 66% probability of limiting temperature rise to 2°C are estimated
between 590GtCO2 and 1240GtCO2 (Friedlingstein et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2016). Carbon budget uncertainty
is largely driven by the dynamics of non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane from agricultural emissions (IPCC, 2014;
Rogelj et al., 2016). The remaining carbon budget to stay below 1.5°C by 2100 with greater than 50% probability
is estimated at 200GtCO2–700GtCO2 (IPCC, 2015; Millar et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Given that cumulative
carbon emissions are a strong linear indicator of temperature increase, historical cumulative emissions can
be seen as one simple measure of proportional responsibility to anthropogenic temperature increase, both
past and future. Ethically attributing responsibility and capability, however, is politically far from simple, with
complex national circumstances to be accounted for and balanced during climate negotiations (Gardiner,
2010; Holz, Kartha, & Athanasiou, 2018).
The cumulative carbon budgets for Ireland utilized in this analysis range from 766 MtCO2 to 128 MtCO2 from
2015 to the end of the time horizon (2070). They are derived from the Irish population share of 0.064% of the
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global population and the same 0.064% share of the remaining global carbon budgets. These carbon budgets
relate to a 66% probability of achieving a 2°C limit, to a 50% probability of reaching a 1.5°C limit, and are chosen
to span the technically feasible range of territorial mitigation. This approach can be justified by the fact that Irish
population as a percentage of the global population has been remarkably stable over the last 50 years, and is
projected to remain so. In addition, unlike other developed nations that industrialized earlier in the 18th and
19th centuries (Nordhaus, 2015), Ireland is not in significant carbon debt (Gignac & Matthews, 2015; Le
Quéré et al., 2015); Irish historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production from
1751 to 2015 are estimated at approximately 2.04GtCO2 (Le Quéré et al., 2016), which is less than 0.064% of
3200GtCO2 the Irish per capita share of the all-time 2°C global carbon budget.
1 However, Ireland has consumed
more than its per capita share of a global 1.5°C carbon budget. Irish per capita territorial CO2 emissions are now
at 8.4tCO2 per person – nearly twice the global average – and are growing. Relatively high per capita income
implies Ireland has significant mitigation capacity.
The results of this analysis show the technology pathway options that meet these carbon budget constraints,
and outline the costs, technology sensitivity, and the macroeconomic impacts of increased decarbonization
ambition.
1.2. Demand response in energy system decarbonization
Irish climate and energy policy legislation has been informed by the Irish-TIMES energy systems model (Deane
et al., 2013), investigating mitigation targets to 2020 (Chiodi, Gargiulo, Deane, et al., 2013), long-term targets to
2050 (Chiodi, Gargiulo, Rogan, et al., 2013), questions of bioenergy import dependency (Chiodi, Deane, Gargiulo,
& Ó Gallachóir, 2015), technical realism of the electricity sector soft-linked to power systems model (Deane,
Chiodi, Gargiulo, & Ó Gallachóir, 2012), energy security (Glynn et al., 2014; Glynn, Chiodi, & Ó Gallachóir,
2017), and agriculture sector feedback to energy system emissions targets (Chiodi et al., 2016). These previous
studies outline the energy system evolution under differing technical and environmental scenario constraints
and solve a partial equilibrium least cost optimization, i.e. equilibrium within the energy market but not the
overall economy. The methodological innovation in this article is in introducing a hybrid general equilibrium
with feedback between the energy system and the macro-economy which outlines how the overall economy
may react to a decarbonizing energy system. The induced changes in economic growth, sectoral energy
service demands, consumption and investments are brought about by substitution of investment capital and
human capital with productive energy services. The method applied in this article is the first national application
of this decomposition general equilibrium method (MSA – MACRO-stand-alone) to calculate first order macro-
economic impacts of decarbonizing the energy system to the Irish economy. Similar methods have been used in
UK, China and global analyses (Chen, 2005; Kypreos & Lehtila, 2015; Strachan & Kannan, 2008). The article esti-
mates GDP losses, changes in consumption and investment for a range of deep decarbonization scenarios, start-
ing with the target of an 80% reduction in energy system CO2 emissions by 2050, and then increasing ambition
with equitable per capita shares of the remaining global carbon budgets with sensitivity to grid inertial limits,
energy service demand reduction, bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS), carbon capture and storage
(CCS) and bioenergy imports in the Irish context.
2. Methods
Please see the Supplementary Material for a detailed description of the Irish-TIMES energy system model and
implementation of the MACRO-stand-alone (MSA) extension.
2.1. Scenario definitions
The 38 scenarios considered are chosen to outline the range of potential energy system changes under differing
effort-sharing carbon budgets based on equitable per capita shares of the remaining global carbon budgets.
This article does not explore emissions inertia grandfathering type constraints where current national per
capita emissions converge to a global average at a point in the future, increasing what could be perceived as
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an equitable carbon budget (Nordhaus, 2015; Peters, Andrew, Solomon, & Friedlingstein, 2017; Pye, Li, Price, &
Fais, 2017; Raupach et al., 2014). Scenario variants are used to account for uncertainty in climate mitigation
policy choices, their implied constraints, immediate action vs delayed action, technology availability, and
energy service demand responses to macroeconomic feedback.
. REF – Reference Energy System Scenario. This scenario shows the least cost optimal energy system evolution
to 2070 in the absence of emissions constraints.
. CO2-80. This scenario achieves at least an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions relative to 1990 by 2050 in line with
the interim targets of the EU 2020 climate energy package (EU, 2009b, 2009a).
. 766 MtCO2. This scenario applies a cumulative CO2 budget of 766 MtCO2 between 2015 and 2070 without
interim CO2-80 annual emissions pathway targets. This constraint is based on an equitable population
weighted (0.064%) carbon budget of future emissions of 1200 GtCO2 consistent with a 66% probability of
meeting a 2°C target with immediate action. This scenario has its solution fixed to the reference solution
to 2015 and evolves thereafter, showing what a post Paris Agreement mitigation pathway with immediate
action from 2015 might have looked like.
. 638 MtCO2. This scenario applies a cumulative CO2 budget of 638 MtCO2 between 2020 and 2070 without
interim emissions pathway targets, with the results fixed to the reference case before 2020. This constraint
is based on an equitable population weighted (0.064%) carbon budget of future emissions of 1000 GtCO2
consistent with a 66% probability of meeting a 2°C target with mitigation action commencing in 2020,
and where exogenous non-CO2 emissions are at the low end of the feasible global range.
. 376 MtCO2. This scenario applies a cumulative CO2 budget of 376 MtCO2 between 2020 and 2070 without
interim emissions pathway targets, with the results fixed to the reference case before 2020. This constraint
is based on an equitable population weighted (0.064%) carbon budget of future emissions of 590 GtCO2 con-
sistent with a 66% probability of meeting a 2°C target with mitigation action commencing in 2020, and where
exogenous non-CO2 emissions are at the high end of the feasible global range. Note that Ireland has high
non-CO2 agricultural emissions.
. 223 MtCO2. This scenario applies a cumulative CO2 budget of 223 MtCO2 between 2015 and 2070 without
interim emissions pathway targets. This constraint is based on an equitable population weighted (0.064%)
carbon budget of future emissions of 350 GtCO2 consistent with a 50% probability of meeting a 1.5°C
target in 2100 with immediate action in 2015.
. 128 MtCO2. This scenario applies a cumulative CO2 budget of 128 MtCO2 between 2015 and 2070 without
interim emissions pathway targets. This constraint is based on an equitable population weighted (0.064%)
carbon budget of future emissions of 200 GtCO2 consistent with a 66% probability of meeting a 1.5°C
target in 2100 with immediate action in 2015. (Note that none of the 128 MtCO2 scenarios proved technically
feasible.)
2.1.1. Scenario sensitivity variant definitions
. MSA. This scenario variant incorporates the MSA algorithm to calculate demand responses and macroeco-
nomic feedback in a general equilibrium.
. DA25. This scenario variant delays mitigation action further to 2025 by fixing the scenario to continue along
the reference path to 2025.
. NoSNSPLim. This scenario variant removes the default limit on system non-synchronous penetration of vari-
able renewable generation, which represents the inertial limits of the Irish electricity grid. This constraint con-
trols for the non-synchronous nature of generators with low inertial mass such as wind turbines and the
potential frequency fluctuations these generators can induce upon an island grid.
. NoBECCS. This scenario variant does not allow BECCS in the power generation sector of the energy system
model.
. NoCCS. This scenario variant does not allow CCS in the power generation sector of the energy system model.
Note that CCS is still allowed in industry for cement production in this scenario variant.
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. NoBioImp. This scenario variant only allows domestic bioenergy to be utilized within the energy system and
does not allow bioenergy imports.
Note: Scenario variants can be run together in combination; and most scenarios in this article combine the MSA
scenario variant to estimate price response and demand feedback with other constraints imposed by another
scenario variant. Each carbon budget scenario is also run without MSA (macroeconomic feedback) to show the
effect of inelastic demand response.
3. Results
Irish CO2 emissions in the energy system are estimated in the official national GHG inventory projections to rise
from 38.5 MtCO2e in 2015 to 48.5 MtCO2e in 2035 as Irish economic activity continues to grow (EPA, 2017).
Under the reference case scenario in this analysis, CO2 emissions do not follow a recovery path as with economic
recovery per se, but find an optimally efficient energy system under reference macroeconomic conditions and
show a flat projection to 42.2 MtCO2e in 2050. The three largest CO2 emitting sectors in the reference scenario in
2050 are transport at 14.8 MtCO2, electricity generation at 9.4 MtCO2 and industry at 6.6 MtCO2. The CO2-80
scenarios follow EU decline rates of 2.2%/yr to final emissions of 6.8 MtCO2 in 2050. The cumulative carbon
budget constraint scenario of 766 MtCO2, consistent with the 2°C target with 66% probability with immediate
action, results in an 81–99% emissions reduction by 2050 from 1990 levels depending on available technology
options and demand reduction options within the economy. The cumulative carbon budget constraint scenarios
of 638 MtCO2–376 MtCO2, consistent with the 2°C target with >66% probability with delayed action until 2020
result in an 81–105% emissions reduction by 2050 again on 1990 levels. Faster emissions reduction rates are
required in the medium term as a result of delayed action, with economic feedback enabling some optimization
of discounted welfare and gross domestic product (GDP) losses while balancing medium-term emissions
reductions and long-term abatement costs. Delayed action between 2015 and 2020 has considerable
impacts on the rates of decarbonization required for a 2°C consistent mitigation pathway. Immediate decarbo-
nization allows slower emissions reductions of 1.6–2 MtCO2/year for a 2°C target, as opposed to the delayed
action case whereby CO2 emissions need to be reduced by 1.6–3 MtCO2/year by 2030 if energy system emis-
sions do not peak until 2020. For a 1.5°C target, emissions reductions need to be immediate and in the
range of 3.5–3.9 MtCO2/year. Annual emissions are reduced by at least half to 18.3 MtCO2 in 2020 for a 1.5°C
consistent scenario using the 223 MtCO2 budget scenario, and slowing to near net zero by 2050. Further
details are in Figure 1.
The electricity generation sector covered by the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) and the transport sector
are the energy system sectors that most require aggressive decarbonizing. Deep decarbonization using a cumu-
lative carbon budget of 128 MtCO2 without macroeconomic demand reductions or bioenergy imports are
infeasible in this model version.
The range of marginal abatement costs of CO2 are logarithmic in scale across the 2°C set of scenarios. CO2
abatement costs begin in 2020 at €75/tCO2 and by 2025 range from €96/tCO2 to €640/tCO2 with a median value
of €132/tCO2 rising to €362/tCO2 to €3308/tCO2 in 2050 in real terms. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets,
the technically feasible scenarios’ abatement costs range from €965/tCO2 to €3080/tCO2 in 2020 and rise to
greater than €8,100/tCO2 by 2050.
3.1. Overall energy system outlook
The overall makeup of the energy system changes radically across the set of scenarios considered and across
individual scenario variants. There is relatively little difference in the 2050 energy systems for 2°C or 1.5°C,
contrasting with the significant variation in 2030 between 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios, highlighting immediate
action is critical for achieving a 1.5°C scenario. It is clear from Figure 2, given the variability of fuels, technol-
ogy choices and carbon intensity across scenarios, and the resultant energy system by 2030, that the public
and private energy investment decisions made before the UNFCCC global stocktake (GST) in 2023, are critical
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in starting a likely pathway towards remaining well below a 2°C threshold, while aiming for 1.5°C. The REF
case is proportionally a continuation of the current energy system. Oil and gas dominate the fuel mix at
7.5 Mtoe and 5.2 Mtoe, respectively and account for 80% of the reference primary energy requirement
(TPER) in 2050.
The 2–1.5°C decarbonization scenarios lead to reductions in TPER relative to the REF of between 18% and
27% by 2030 largely as a result of demand reduction, energy efficiency and fuel switching. Natural gas is
used as a bridging fuel in the medium term, being substituted by a trend towards consumption of bioenergy
for energy intensive demands in transport and industry, and electrification in less energy intensive demands
in lighting and low temperature heating. Natural gas is also used as an alternative to bioenergy in electricity
generation for scenario variants when bioenergy imports are not allowed. Higher electrification increases
installed generation capacity from 6.7 GW in the 2030 reference case, to 9.6–10.8 GW in the 2°C scenarios,
and 13.5 GW in the 1.5°C scenarios where renewable electricity makes up 5.1–6.4–7.8 GW of installed capacity.
Onshore wind energy and natural gas, dominate the generation mix to 2030, beyond which gas-CCS, bioenergy
and BECCS become prevalent.
The sectoral proportions of Total Final Energy Consumption (TFC) remain largely as they are in 2015, with the
industrial demand reduction response being larger than in other sectors due to lack of technology substitution
options for some industrial energy services. The TFC in the reference case in 2030 is 12.4 Mtoe, with the 2°C
scenarios ranging from 10.6 Mtoe to 9.7 Mtoe. Fossil fuels as a proportion of TFC drop from 77% in the reference
case, to 62–39% for the 2°C scenario in 2030 and to less than 8% in the 1.5°C scenario. Bioenergy represents
more than 16–34% of TFC by 2030 in all 2°C scenarios in variants without bioenergy limits, with electricity repre-
senting the remainder, ranging between 22% and 27% TFC. The shift to indigenous bioenergy and renewables
has a positive influence on energy security by reducing import dependency to 67% in the 1.5°C scenarios, from
91% in the reference scenario in 2030.
Figure 1. Energy system CO2 emissions pathways per scenario variant run.
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Figure 2. Total final energy consumption and electricity generation by fuel per scenario variant.
CLIMATE POLICY 7
3.2. Energy service demand response and consumption
A key element of this analysis is including and quantifying the role of energy service demand reduction as an
element in national mitigation strategy as it endogenously responds to price changes in a bottom up technol-
ogy rich model. Energy service demand response significantly affects decarbonization trajectories and the CO2
abatement cost. Scenarios, sectors and energy service demands with the largest abatement cost, induce the
largest overall energy system costs and incur the largest energy service demand adjustment (see Figure 2, sup-
plementary material). Energy service demand reductions, relative to the reference case in the decarbonization
scenarios, range from 5 to 19% by 2030 in the residential sector, and further up to 50% demand reduction in
some energy and carbon insensitive industry sectors such as lime and cement production. This demand
reduction is brought about through the elasticity of demand with price. The abatement cost of CO2 is exacer-
bated for energy service demands in sectors with limited alternative low carbon technology options, creating
the need for innovation in construction materials manufacturing and fossil fuel dependent rail transport in
Ireland. In terms of passenger transport options, private car energy service demand drops by 5–10% for the
2°C decarbonization scenarios by 2030. Intercity diesel trains show the largest transport demand reductions
of 3–13% by 2030, all relative to the reference scenario. Road freight sees a similar reduction in demand of
5–17% by 2030. The energy service demand reductions are plotted in Table 1 in the Supplementary Material.
These demand reductions are induced by the cost of the technology choices and the carbon intensity of
these technologies driving fuel switching and efficiency in the system.
The energy system costs, consumption losses, and sectoral CO2 emissions are plotted in Figure 2 in the Sup-
plementary Material and show that reductions in consumption play a significant role in achieving deeper dec-
arbonization goals both in the medium term to 2030 and increasingly to 2050. The ‘carbon budget’ scenarios
without macroeconomic feedback in contrast to the same scenario with macroeconomic feedback, ‘MSA’, high-
light the considerable role of reductions in energy service demand response and the consequent changes in
material consumption towards cost reductions in achieving a 2°C target, and even more so for a 1.5°C consistent
scenario.
3.3. Economic impacts of mitigation
Energy systems models do not produce forecasts, but instead can provide insights as the decision-making
process of a benevolent system planner, minimizing the cost of the energy system in line with the social
good. Enforcing a national carbon budget shifts the portfolio of energy system costs toward increased invest-
ment in new low carbon infrastructure and generation capacity, reducing the fuel bill of incumbent carbon-
intensive technologies, while minimizing other variable costs. Figure 2 in the Supplementary Material shows
the cost breakdown for the years 2030 and 2050 for the reference scenario, alongside the 2°C and 1.5°C decar-
bonization scenarios as a percentage of projected GDP. The reference energy system discounted cost is €24.5bn
in 2030, 9.2% of a projected €267bn GDP in 2015 Euro prices. The gross cost of the energy system consistent
with the 2°C scenarios increases in the order of 0.6% GDP in 2030 relative to the reference case. The structure
of the costs changes, as there is an increase in investment costs of up to 18% from the reference case, with a
reduction in fuel costs of 13–20%. The trend changes somewhat by 2050, with increases in real terms and as a
proportion of GDP for energy system costs. Consumption reductions and energy service demand reductions
become a larger component of the energy system costs in meeting the more ambitious 2–1.5°C scenarios.
Investment costs continue to increase for the 2°C scenarios up 23–26% from the reference case. Fuel costs in
the 2050 2°C cases generally remain smaller than the reference case.
3.4. Maintaining economic growth in deep decarbonization scenarios
The annualized GDP growth for the reference calibration scenario is projected at 4% between 2015 and 2020,
slowing to 2.2% in 2020, and 1.2% beyond 2030 growing to €338bn by 2050 in 2015 Euro prices. The projected
actual GDP, for each scenario for each period year, reflects the increasing energy costs when including the exter-
nal cost of carbon and resultant relative loss in projected GDP. The 2°C decarbonization scenarios GDP losses
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range from 0.1 to 0.3% by 2020, highlighting the low-hanging fruit, and relatively negligible losses in GDP in the
short term to 2020. By 2030 GDP losses range from 0.5 to 3.2% GDP, increasing with the level of ambition for
decarbonization and delays in action. Final GDP losses in 2050 range from 1.3 to 3.3% in the 2°C scenarios (see
Figure 3 Supplementary Material). The 1.5–°C scenarios show GDP losses in the medium term to 2030 of 3.6–
5.2% relaxing then to 2.7–3.9% by 2050. The annualized effect of these GDP losses in the 2°C scenarios
dampens GDP growth slightly, slowing relative to the reference case by up to 0.4% per year with a median
value of 0.05% per year in the short term, and by 0.13% in the medium term to 2030. While the economic reces-
sion of −3.9% real GDP in 2008 and −4.6% in 2009 and the resultant austerity imposed is still present in the
memory of Irish policy and investment planners, this analysis shows the Irish economy could continue to
grow considerably, at rates above the projected EU average, with more than 2.2% growth in the 1.5°C cases
and more than 3.9% growth in the 2°C cases.
4. Discussion
Compared to national EU mitigation targets set before the Paris Agreement, short-term national mitigation
ambition needs to increase to play an equitable role in meeting the Paris Agreement goals. Equitable carbon
budgets induce awareness of long-term net-zero emissions requirements to stabilize temperature, meaning
that national EU targets need to look beyond 2050 to achieve a least cost trajectory, as ambitious early
action reduces long-term costs and risks beyond the current planning horizon. The current EU climate and
energy package targets of an 80−95% reduction of GHG from 1990 levels by 2050 are likely to underestimate
the short-term and long-term mitigation ambition required at a national level to equitably meet the Paris Agree-
ment. EU policy did not envision a global 1.5°C target temperature limit, and thus currently underestimates the
action required to meet this goal. A collective review and ratcheting of EU-28 and national mitigation targets is
therefore required to test consistency with pathways to stay well below 2°C and long-term net zero emissions
requirements by 2070. While equity principles are generally concerned with inter-regional equity, inter-genera-
tional equity and life style and welfare constraints imposed by delayed action and carbon budgets should also
be considered.
Reductions in consumption play a significant role in achieving deeper decarbonization goals both in the
medium term to 2030 and increasingly so beyond to 2050. Maximizing the social good by minimizing the
carbon intensity of consumption is a potential systematic policy target to efficiently minimize sectoral carbon
emissions. This overarching objective could be balanced with sectoral objectives of maximizing the production
of low carbon intensity per value added goods and services. In an efficient carbon market framework, the
economy could aim to maximize value added production with the lowest carbon intensity, which, with compe-
tition, should converge over time to an average carbon intensity per value added across all sectors; without this
efficiency some sectors will be required to inefficiently and expensively mitigate above the optimum abatement
levels and costs per sector, resulting in higher than necessary carbon abatement costs to the economy as a
whole. A national social cost of carbon fee on goods and services, which rises annually (see Figure 1 in the Sup-
plementary Material for scale) until net-CO2 neutrality is achieved, is one such policy instrument to induce
investment in decarbonizing the energy system. There is no implicit assumption that this fee is collected by gov-
ernment in this model, but the implementation method could have macroeconomic consequences and should
be designed carefully. This carbon fee could be balanced by revenue recycling to ensure net-neutral tax revenue
to government, no increased tax burden on individuals, while incentivizing institutional and behavioural decar-
bonization. Other revenue recycling options could include accelerated payment of government debt, or econ-
omic stimulus in co-benefits of low carbon mitigation, climate adaptation measures and energy poverty
alleviation.
It is clear that energy system investments made before the Paris Agreement GST in 2023, and the resultant
energy system by 2030 are critical in determining the likelihood of remaining below a 2°C threshold, while
aiming for 1.5°C. While the energy system cost requirements for 2°C and 1.5°C pathways slow economic
growth, the transition to a net-zero carbon energy system is not envisaged to be a considerable concern
to growth. As the structure of the economy changes in a decarbonized energy system and the relative
energy service demand costs of carbon intensive sectors becomes expensive, there is a greater incentive
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for technical innovation and entrepreneurial opportunities. The myopic political option value of delayed action
should be assessed against the increased economic opportunity costs, mitigation costs and climate damage
risks.
It should be noted that this model does not include an economic damage function or ecosystem service
losses as a result of production changes due to climate change, nor does it include the induced competition
effect due to unequal international effort sharing over time (Millar et al., 2007; Stern, 2006; The Global Commis-
sion on the Economy and Climate, 2014). An economic climate damages function may have a positive effect on
relative economic growth compared to the reference case, as mitigation will reduce climate damages to the
economy and capitalize on opportunities in developing new industries and services around emergent low
carbon technologies and innovation, increased ecosystem services and natural capital accumulation. Compe-
tition effects may depend on the impact on production costs from the relative rate of decarbonization
between trade partners and competitors. Inclusion of an ecological economic feedback mechanism to a struc-
tural economy model including an ecosystem service damage function will give greater insight into the econ-
omic costs and benefits of decarbonizing the energy system.
Limits on System Non Synchronous Penetration (SNSP) of variable renewable generation becomes a binding
constraint on the power system in deep decarbonization scenarios for Ireland. If the Irish electricity grid can
increase the stable levels of acceptable variable renewable generation, this affects the generation mix, the
level of electrification, and reduces the marginal abatement cost of CO2. Imported bioenergy availability is
the most considerable model sensitivity in terms of feasible rates of decarbonization and macroeconomic
impact.
5. Conclusion
The modelling results suggest that a cumulative carbon budget induces a different optimum decarbonization
trajectory shape than a linear trajectory to an 80% GHG reduction as in the current EU policy, and thus differing
annual emission reduction targets and investment portfolios are optimal. The removal of each marginal tonne of
CO2 is more difficult, therefore considering carbon budgets instead of annual emission targets, rates of decar-
bonization are faster in the near term removing low-hanging fruit, than the medium and longer term, and is
dependent on discounting and inter-generational equity. The cumulative carbon budget constraint scenarios
of 638 MtCO2–376 MtCO2, consistent with a 2°C target with >66% probability with delayed action until 2020
results in an 81−105% emissions reduction by 2050.
Delayed action considerably increases CO2 abatement costs in both the medium and long term. Delayed
action between 2015 and 2020 has considerable impacts on the rates of decarbonization required for a 2°C con-
sistent mitigation pathway. Immediate decarbonization allows slower emissions reductions of 1.6–2 MtCO2/year
for a 2°C target, as opposed to the delayed action case whereby CO2 emissions need to be reduced by 1.6–3
MtCO2/year by 2030 if energy system emissions do not peak until 2020.
This hybrid model approach shows that using equitable carbon budgets creating ambitious decarbonization
of the Irish energy system is not excessively expensive as a proportion of GDP, nor is the reduction in production
significant enough to pose concern for annual economic growth. Even in the case of deep decarbonization path-
ways based on equity principles, with more ambitious emission reductions than EU 2050 targets, this analysis
shows the economic impact is not significant, in that the economic growth is projected to continue across
each scenario. Rapid and highly ambitious decarbonization for the 1.5°C target does incur a considerable
slowing of GDP growth in the short term. A social cost of carbon scheme requires assessment in greater
detail with a structural computable general equilibrium model of the economy for more policy prescriptive
insights to the distributional effects, impacts of revenue recycling, and biases to competitiveness from
unequal international rates and costs of decarbonization.
Note
1. The 3200GtCO2 figure is based on the historical emissions range of 2200GtCO2 (±257GtCO2) from the global carbon project (Le
Quéré et al., 2016) added to the remaining central 2°C budget of 1000GtCO2 from Friedlingstein et al. (2014).
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